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The Joint Communication on the Eastern Partnership (EaP)1 published in March offers a broad 
array of policy orientations but relatively little operational specificity.  
This drafting is presumably intended to be acceptable to all six EaP states. The lack of reference 
to the joint request of the three states with Association Agreements (AAs) – Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine – to open a ‘quadrilogue’ with the EU to treat matters of common concern to 
them, and which are not relevant or plausible in relation to the other EaP states, is a glaring 
omission that could still be corrected at the EaP summit on 18 June. This summit should also 
agree on EaP policy beyond 2020, with the partner states, and include the many transnational 
issues worthy of quadrilateral consultations, such as how revisions of major EU policies (for 
instance, on energy, climate and competition) may affect the associated states.  
 
1 Communication by the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
“Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020 – Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all”, 
JOIN(2020)7 final, 18 March 2020. 
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The Covid-19 context  
‘Corona’ is only given a passing reference in the Joint Communication, understandably so 
because at the time of publication this huge crisis was only just getting underway in Europe. 
Yet, the time between now and the June summit will allow for a fuller treatment of its 
implications for the EaP. Being a quintessentially humanitarian crisis, it deserves an EaP-wide 
response. EU support for supplies of medical equipment is a first immediate necessity, to be 
followed in due course by intensified cooperation over counter-pandemic capabilities along 
with macro-financial assistance to help survive the oncoming deep recession. The EU’s recent 
decision to allocate grant funds for immediate needs, such as the acquisition of medical 
equipment, and for ensuring liquidity for SMEs, provides exactly the type of assistance that the 
EaP countries have been waiting for.2 
The Communication highlights the call for ‘resilience’ under five strategic headings. The Covid-
19 crisis now dramatically and tragically underlines the need for a sixth policy goal – for public 
health resilience, with corresponding requirements for systemic cooperation between public 
health authorities, hospitals, laboratories, research, emergency capabilities, etc.  
An agenda of questionable weight  
The Communication covers a huge landscape of policy domains, first of all economic issues, 
which take up much of the paper. The text refers to deepening economic integration through 
full implementation of the current Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), 
and selective and gradual economic integration into the EU’s internal market, which is not 
explained.3 At the same time, the paper gives place to currently rising policy areas, notably on 
the energy/environment/climate nexus (green deal), digital and cyber, transport (Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T) infrastructure and civil aviation) and the Single European 
Payment Area (SEPA). It also proposes a new deal for youth.  
Green deal. The EU’s proposed green deal has potentially huge and complex implications for 
the energy, environmental and climate policy domains, especially for the DCFTA states given 
their close approximation of the EU acquis in these areas, and their signalled interest in joining 
the initiative. This is an example of where dialogue between the associated states and the EU 
should be initiated (in ‘quad’ format, on which see more below).  
 
2 European Commission, “Coronavirus: The European Union stands by its Eastern partners”, Press release, 30 
March 2020. 
3 As for mechanisms for integration into the internal market, there is only a reference to the Authorised Economic 
Operators scheme, but for example there is failure to mention the possible Agreements for Conformity Analysis 
and Assessment for technical standards. 
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Digital and cyber. The fast-growing digital and cyber agendas are summarised. On digital the 
associated states have already adopted what the document advocates with respect to the legal 
frameworks for electronic identification schemes and electronic trust services, and there is 
scope for the other three EaP states to catch up. However, the text fails to respond to the 
ambition of the AA states to join the Digital Single Market. The EU seeks to work towards a 
roaming agreement in the EaP area, but the main interest of the partner states would be for a 
roaming agreement between them and the EU itself. 
Physical connectivity. Transport and energy are traditional areas promoted by the EU for 
physical interconnections with the EaP region, and the text gives due attention to the TEN-T 
networks and gas corridors. But on road transport there is no recognition of the need for 
adequate road transport agreements. This is now an urgent matter, given that the desired 
trade expansion between the EU and Ukraine is threatened by the EU’s archaic (‘pre-single 
market’) regime of bilateral road haulage permits. The protectionist policies of some EU 
member states in this sector are not fair to the DCFTA partner states that have opened their 
economies to overwhelmingly more powerful European enterprises – while the DCFTA states 
catch up in implementing their approximation commitments in this field.  
New deal for youth. A number of desirable policy objectives are listed under this heading, but 
the instruments are either not specified or are fragmentary. The Bologna process is hardly a 
new deal. The reader has the impression that this non-political area was seen as an easily 
acceptable topic for all six Eastern partners, without the substance to justify the grand heading.  
Weaknesses and omissions  
No specific timeframe. The Communication is silent about the timeframe it covers and only 
specifies that it refers to the period “beyond 2020”. It is thus unclear what time horizon is 
envisaged.  
No strategic political objectives. The document does not set any strategic objectives to indicate 
where this extensive agenda should lead, for either the AA states or the EaP as a whole. It silent 
about the political question ‘what next?’. It reads as a compilation of various ongoing measures 
and policies between the EU and the EaP states.  
Token wording on democracy. It is disappointing that the text gives no more than an occasional 
word of support for good democratic practice, often preferring the ambiguous term 
“governance”. There is much on the need for a robust rule of law, but if that is not 
accompanied by democracy it serves to reinforce authoritarianism.  
It is welcome that the EU wants civil society to “meaningfully engage in policy-making 
processes and dialogue”. The Communication also says that “civil society organisations are 
crucial for disseminating EU-positive messages”. Let us therefore come straight to the point. 
Civil society organisations and think tanks such as ours are unhappy with the inadequate 
4 | EMERSON, BLOCKMANS, CENUSA, KOVZIRIDZE & MOVCHAN 
 
references to democratic governance, with just a few token words. Achieving high standards 
of democratic practice is a continuing, intense and ongoing struggle in all three associated 
states and Armenia, while the struggle is simply suppressed in Belarus and Azerbaijan. Civil 
society in these countries count on the EU to keep up the pressure and incentives in support 
of high-quality democracy. The alliance of civil society organisations in the associated states 
and the international community, and the EU first of all, can be of decisive influence at critical 
points. The text can lead civil society organisations to be unsure whether the EU is going to be 
a consistently strong partner on such issues.  
Silence on gender policy. This is ignored, very surprisingly in view of the EU’s overall gender 
policy, and its intention to mainstream the policy in its international relations. The Commission 
has very recently (also in March 2020) issued a comprehensive Communication on its gender 
policy.4 In 2018, the Council adopted conclusions on women, peace and security,5 to which the 
Joint Communication refers. But overall the text is odd, in covering such a large number of 
issues while ignoring gender policy as such. The new gender Communication should provide 
the basis to fill this gap. 
Silence on the unresolved separatist conflicts. This is also ignored, beyond formulaic words 
about being committed to the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Existing formats of diplomacy 
for dealing with the conflicts affecting EaP states largely exclude the EU as such. The partner 
states expect more of the EU, and are puzzled why for example the ‘Normandy format’ for the 
Donbas involving France and Germany could not replicate the old ‘Iran model’ where there 
was leading EU participation alongside three member states. In the case of the Transdniestrian 
region, the EU’s observer status should be advanced to that of a full-fledged participant. 
Detailed recommendations for how the EU could do more have been set out in a recent 
publication covering all the unresolved conflicts of Eastern Europe.6 
Inadequate specification of ‘more for more’. There is continued invocation of the more-for-
more principle, without operational guidelines over what ‘more’ the EU might contribute in 
relation to what ‘more’ policy reform measures it seeks from the EaP states. Matters of 
detailed conditionality are of course something for bilateral negotiations, but a more credible 
operational framing of the principle is still needed for it to be seen as more than a slogan.  
 
4 European Commission, “A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025”, COM(2020) 152 final, 5 
March 2020. 
5 Council of the European Union, “Women, Peace and Security”, 15086/18, 10 December 2018. 
6 T. de Waal and N. von Twickel, Beyond Frozen Conflict – Scenarios for the Separatist Disputes of Eastern Europe, 
Brussels/London: CEPS/RLI, 2020. 
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The strategic omission – silence on the joint request of the AA/DCFTA states  
The Joint Communication draws on many themes that feature in the contributions by the EaP 
states to the ‘structured consultation’ conducted in 2019. Still, there is one proposition 
common to the submissions of the three states with AAs – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – 
that is ignored, namely their wish to open joint dealings or dialogue with the EU. This would 
treat matters of common concern to them, and which are not relevant or plausible in relation 
to the other EaP states. 
This omission from the Communication should be corrected with agreement to extend the use 
of the quadrilateral format between the EU with the three associated states for which there is 
one precedent already, namely ‘quad’ meetings of trade policy officials/ministers. There are 
many other issues that deserve quadrilogue, including how revisions of major EU policies (like 
those on energy, climate and competition) may affect the associated states. There is also need 
for debate at a suitable political level on strategic orientations for overarching aspects of the 
association relationship.  
The original AA/DCFTA was negotiated around a decade ago with Ukraine alone, and this 
became the model for the other agreements, with some differences but a large commonality 
in the texts. Since then, the AA/DCFTA system has matured. The EU has always sought to 
encourage intra-regional cooperation and integration. The three associated states have 
reached the point of being ready for and are requesting quadrilateral deliberations. Their 
bilateral relations will no doubt remain of primary importance. But this should not be to the 
exclusion of needed quad business. 
The omission of reference to the joint request of the three AA states correlates with the very 
general level of policy orientations in much of the paper, with relatively little operational 
specificity. This drafting is presumably intended to be acceptable to all six EaP states.  
Differentiation and inclusiveness doctrine. These terms used by the EU institutions will sound 
obscurely doctrinal and remote to the peoples of the Eastern Partnership. By contrast, for 
those involved in EU policy these words are vehicles of debate and negotiation within the EU 
institutions, and between them and the member states, and stand for alternative priorities. Of 
course, there is diplomatic discourse saying that there has to be both. But in reality they 
concern strategic priorities, how far the ambitious European integration objectives of the three 
associated states are to be supported, or how much the agenda of the Eastern Partnership is 
to be limited to what all six partner states can accept, with the risk of a lowest common 
denominator factor. The absence so far of response from the EU to the request of the three 
associated states to have joint dealings with the EU is a discouraging signal for them.  
These two opposing paradigms can be reconciled along the following lines. The three 
associated states can be encouraged to deepen their integration with the EU, politically and 
economically, as far as they wish and are able to do so (without raising the question of 
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enlargement procedures). The operational instruments for so doing can be clearly identified. 
There should be a presumption that such instruments should be open in principle to the other 
three EaP states, and Armenia shows that it wants to follow this path to a considerable degree. 
However, where there are political, institutional or legal reasons why this is not possible, these 
have to be recognised: for example, two EaP states do not want to commit to European 
political values, and have limited trade integration possibilities due to their lack of membership 
of the WTO. These basic facts should not hold back the associated states in the name of 
assuring ‘inclusiveness’.  
The argument sometimes heard in EU circles is that some special institutional arrangements 
with the three associates together would discourage the other three from cooperation in the 
EaP. There is no evidence for this assertion. On the contrary, if the EU’s cooperation with the 
three associates is seen to be rich and dynamic, this will encourage the other three to engage 
further wherever the instruments in question are feasible for them.    
CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, CEPS is widely recognised as the most experienced and 
authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS acts as a leading forum 
for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research capacity and 
complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
 Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the
challenges facing Europe today
 Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence
 Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process
 Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and
recommendations
Assets 
 Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable
analysts
 Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research
expertise and to extend its outreach
 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding
board for the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy, Resources and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
